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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the State of Utah

(Defendant-Appellant)

is

entitled to full reimbursement of its medicaid expenses of
$15,018.41 from $20,000.00 recovered by Plaintiff-Respondent

in a

settlement with the insurance company of the third party tortfeasor.
2.

Whether the State of Utah

(Defendant-Appellant)

should be required to pay any portion of the legal costs related
to Plaintiff-Respondent f s settlement with the insurance company
and subsequent litigation.
3.

Alternatively, if the decision of the lower court

is upheld, whether a factual error made by the lower court in its
computation of percentage relative to the allocation of the
proceeds of the $20,000.00 recovery should be corrected.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant appeals from a lower court decision
thatf pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7, Defendant-Appellant
was entitled only to $3,280.00 from a $20,000.00 third party
settlement entered into by Plaintiff-Respondent, rather than the
full $15,018.41 paid by Defendant-Appellant for medical expenses
for Plaintiff-Respondentfs deceased.
STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS
Carol Camp, Plaintiff-Respondent, is the mother of
Tammy Kadel.

On June 15, 1985, Tammy Kadel was a passenger in a

999Chevy Pickup driven by Anthony Shane Stevens.

On 1-15

9approximately ten miles north of Glendale, Nevada, Stevens
negligently lost control of the pickup, and it rolled over.
Tammy was thrown from the pickup as it rolled.

After the acci-

dent, Tammy was taken to Valley Hospital in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Tammy suffered multiple injuries including skull fracture,
punctured lung, broken clavicle and various internal injuries.
Tammy lived for six days, and died on June 21, 1985 as a result
of her injuries.
As a direct and proximate result of the accident, Tammy
incurred medical expenses as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Valley Hospital Medical Center
Doctors Emergency Medical Service
Joseph Warpinski
Radiology Associates of Nevada
Cardiovascular Surgery Associates
Cardiology Hospital Services
Neurosurgical Associates

TOTAL

$32,069.55
433.01
1,040.00
819.00
433.00
100.00
4,160.00
$39,054.56

The State of Utah, through the Medical program, paid $15,018.41
in full satisfaction of the medical expenses listed above,
sometime after October 31, 1985.
On July 23, 1985, Carol Camp retained Robert DeBry and
Associates to represent her in her claim against Stevens, the
driver.
Stevens, the driver, was insured in th amount of
$20,000.00 by Farmers Insurance Group.

Donna Harmon of Farmers

tendered policy limits of $20,000.00 to Robert DeBry and
Associates on September 3, 1985.

Sometime before October 14,

1985, Farmers delivered a draft in the amount of $20,000.00 to
Robert DeBry and Associates.

The draft was then negotiated and

the funds placed in the Robert DeBry Client Trust Account on or
about November 20, 1985.

The funds are currently in that trust

account.
On October 22, 1985, defendant sent a "Verified Lien
Statement" to Robert DeBry and Associates which was received on
October 24, 1985.

At that time, defendant had made no payment of

funds, and the lien was in no specific amount.

On October 28,

1985, Farmers received a copy of the lien statement from
defendant.

On January 18, 1986, Robert DeBry & Associates

received a second lien statement in the amount of $15,018.41.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court below erred in its interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 26-19-7 and its finding that, of $20,000.00 recovered
by Plaintiff-Respondent against a third party, DefendantAppellant was not entitled to recoup its full medical assistance
cost of $15,018.41.

Because Plaintiff-Respondent violated the terms and
conditions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 by taking
unitary action to recover damages against a third party without
the written consent of the State of Utah/ Defendant-Appellant
cannot be required to share in any costs pursuant to DefendantRespondent's recovery or subsequent related actions.
Alternatively, in the event this Court upholds the
decision of the lower court, a factual error made by the lower
court in its computation of percentages relative to the
allocation of the $20,000.00 recovery should be corrected.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO FULL
REIMBURSEMENT OF ITS MEDICAL EXPENSES FROM
THE PROCEEDS OF PLAINTIFFfS INSURANCE RECOVERY
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-5(1) provides as follows:
"If the department provides or becomes
obligated to provide medical assistance to a
recipient because of an injury, disease or
disability for which a third party is liable,
the department may recover the medical assistance
from that third party."
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7(1)(a) and (2) further
provide that:
"A recipient may not file a claim or commence
an action against a third party for recovery of
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability
for which the department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance
without the department's written consent."
*

*

*

"If the recipient proceeds without the department's
written consent as required by Subsection (1)(a),
4

the department is not bound by any decision,
judgment/ agreement or compromise rendered or made
on the claim or in the action, and the department
may recover in full from the recipient all medical
assistance which it has provided and shall maintain
its right to commence an independent action
against the third party, subject to Subsection
26-19-5(3)."
Subsection 26-19-5(3) provides, in part, that the
department's claim "is not enforceable as to a third party unless
(i) the third party receives the written notice of the
department's claim before settling with the recipient, or (ii) in
settling with the recipient the third party excludes the amount
of the medical assistance."

(See also Johnston County v.

McCormick, 308 S.E.2d 872, 874, 875 (N.C. App. 1983)).
On the case at bar, the Plaintiff-Respondent violated
Subsection 26-19-7(1)(a) by filing and settling a claim against a
third-party insurance company without either the written consent
or even the knowledge of the department.

The proceeds from that

claim, of $20,000.00, represent the fully policy limits available
against the tort-feasor driver.

The District Court, in its

Memorandum Decision correctly recognized that the $20,000.00
represented less than the total value of the case (Exhibit A,
Memorandum Decision, Page 3 ) , but erred in apportioning the
$20,000.00.

The District Court determined the fair value of the

case to be $91,554.56.

The Court then reasoned that the

$15,018.41 paid by the State in medical expenses represented
16.4% of the total value of the damages.

On that basis, the

Court found the Defendant-Appellant entitled to recoup 16.4% of
5

the $20,000.00 that was actually available, or $3,280.00.
(Exhibit A, p.5). This ruling violates the clear statutory
requirement as set forth in Subsection 26-19-7(2), which provides
that "the department may recover in full from the recipient all
medical assistance which it has provided" in the event a
recipient proceeds with a claim against a third party without the
department's written consent.
The correct outcome would to have been to reimburse the
department the full $15,018.41 paid as medical assistance on
behalf of the recipient.

Although, in view of loss of life

involved in this case, such a result may seem harsh, it is both
fair and consistent with public policy as evidenced by a number
of court decisions.
A 1984 Indiana case is very much like the case at bar
both as to the facts and the controlling state statutes.

In

Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 4
Dist. 1984), a 16 year old passenger in an automobile suffered
serious and permanent injuries.

The Medicaid program,

administered by a State Department, provided $49,320.40 for
treatment of her injuries.

The State filed a lien for this

amount on any recovery obtained from the drivers or their
insurers.

Eventually, a trial court approved a settlement of

$106,500.00.

In apportioning the settlement, the trial court

determined the State was entitled to only $15,000.00 in
satisfaction of its lien.

6

In its appeal/ the State cited Indiana Codef 12-1-724.6/ which/ rauch like Utah's statutory counterpart/ had recently
replaced a subrogation provision.

The new statute provides as

follows:
Sec. 24.6.(a) whenever:
(1) the department pays medical expenses
for or on behalf of a person who has been
injured or has suffered an illness or disease
as a result of the negligence or act of
another person; and
(2) the injured or diseased person asserts
a claim against the other person for
damages resulting from the injury/ illness*
or disease;
the department has a lien against the other person*
to the extent of the amount paid by the department*
on any recovery under the claim* whether by
judgment/ compromise or settlement.
(b) Whenever:
(1) the department pays for medical
expenses or renders medical services on
behalf of a person who has been injured
or has suffered an illness or disease;
and
(2) that person asserts a claim against
any insurer as a result of his injury/
illness, or disease;
the department has a lien against the insurer/
to the extent of the amount paid by the
department, on any recovery from the insurer.
471 N.E.2d at 8/ 9.

(Emphasis as cited in Mclntyre).

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had
erred by not allocating the full $49/320.40 paid by medicaid/
observing that:

7

"The Court must accord statutory
words, phrases, and punctuation their plain,
ordinary, and usual meaning. When the
language used in the statute is clear and
unambiguous and the intent of the legislative
unmistakable, we must adopt the meaning plainly
expressed."
471 N.E.2d at 9.
Utahfs statute is no less clear than Indiana's.
Subsection 26-19-7(1)(a) clearly prohibits a recipient of
medicaid assistance from filing "a claim or commencing an action
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has
provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance
without the departments written consent."

Subsection 26-19-7(2)

makes it equally clear that if a recipient proceeds without the
written consent as required by Subsection (1) (a) , "the department
may recover in full from the recipient all medical assistance
which it has provided . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2).

(Emphasis supplied).
In spite of the Indiana Court of Appeals1 clarity in
Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, a similar issue arose in
Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare v. Larson, 486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind.
App. 3 Dist. 1985).

Confusion had once again arisen over the use

of the term "lien" in the new statute, as opposed to the term
"subrogation" in the prior statute.

Here, as in Mclntyre* the

Court determined that the use of equitable principles and
discretion in determining reimbursement to the department for
8

medicaid benefits, and held that the state was entitled to
reimbursement for the full amount of the lien, less an
appropriate amount of attorney fees and expenses.

(Such attorney

fees and expenses are inappropriate in the case at bar, as will
be shown under Point II.)
Larson is useful in analyzing the facts and statutes
relative to the case at bar in that it makes clear the difference
between the "lien" approach and the "subrogation" approach to
medicaid recovery.
"A lien is a claim which one holds on9
the property of another as security for
an indebtedness or charge [citation omitted J.
Therefore, the equitable principles and
discretion in determining reimbursement
pursuant to a subrogation statute do not
apply to reimbursement to the State for the
Medicaid benefits. The DPW is entitled to
a lien for the full amount of its expenditures on behalf of the recipient . . * ."
486 N.E.2d at 548.

(Emphasis added).

Even though U.C.A. § 26-19-7 makes no express reference
to the use of a lien, Subsection 26-19-13(1) makes clear the fact
that the lien approach (as opposed to subrogation) is used in
this state.

The latter section provides that:

"No lien or encumbrance shall be
imposed against the property of a recipient
before his death because of medical assistance
correctly paid or to be paid on his behalf
before he is 65 years of age, except as provided
by Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3)."
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13(1).

(Emphasis added).

The reference to Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3) ties
the lien concept to those Subsections with all the legal
implications that distinguish it from the equitable concept of
subrogation.

Inasmuch as Plaintiff-Respondent attempted/ in its
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Exhibit D, p . 3 ) , to
interpret Subsection 26-19-13(2) as a limitation on DefendantRespondent's right of recovery in the instant case, and
apparently continues to hold that same position in its later
Reply Brief (Exhibit C, p.5), some discussion as to PlaintiffRespondent's misapplication of this statute is in order.

Two

major and several minor points of clarification are useful:
1.

Subsection 26-19-13(2) cannot be read alone without

also reading the other Subsections that accompany it.

Subsection

26-19-13(1) provides that:
"No lien or encumbrance shall be imposed
against the property of a recipient before his
death because of medical assistance correctly
paid or to be paid on his behalf before he is
65 years of age, except as provided by Subsection
26-19-7(2) and (3)."
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13(1).

(Emphasis added).

This Subsection establishes at least two relevant
points:

First, Utah uses the "lien" approach as opposed to the

"subrogation" approach.

The significance of this distinction has

already been discussed.

Second, except as provided in Subsection

26-19-7(2) and (3), it places a limitation on the use of liens
against property before a recipient's death if he is under 65
years of age.

The Subsection says nothing about lien

restrictions as to already deceased recipients who have not
reached 65 years of age.

10

2.

Subsection 26-19-13(2) sets forth restrictions

relative to recovery against the estates of recipients who were
65 years or older at death*

It says nothing about recovering

against the estate of a recipient who died before 65 years of
age.
Taking Subsections 26-19-13(1) and (2) together, two
possible conclusions can be drawn:

First/ neither of the

Subsections actually limit the use of a lien or encumbrance
against the estate of a recipient who died before reaching age
65.

In fact. Subsection 26-19-13(1) does not deal with estates

at all, but/ rather/ the use of a lien or encumbrance against the
property of a person yet living who has not yet reached 65 years
of age.

The Subsection then excepts property recovered from

third parties pursuant to the circumstances set forth in
Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3). In other words, under the facts
of the case at barf it is appropriate to impose a lien "against
the property of a recipient before his death because of medical
assistance correctly paid or to be paid on his behalf before he
is 65 years of age . . . "

Note that nothing is said in

Subsection 26-19-13(1) about imposing a lien or encumbrance
relative to a recipient after his death who was under 65 years of
age.

Since Subsection 26-19-13(2) speaks only of recovery

against the estate of a recipient who was 65 years of age or
older, one must conclude that the statute does not restrict/ in
any wayf the use of a lien against the estate of a person who
never reached 65 years of age.
11

Second, there is considerable room for doubt that in
cases like the one at bar that the lien is actually imposed upon
the estate of the deceased to begin with.

In a recent California

case, that state asserted medical liens for amounts expended for
medical services rendered to a decedent recipient against the
settlement proceeds in a wrongful death action brought by the
decedent's husband and son.

Shelton v. Fresno Community Hospital

(State), 219 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1985).
found that:

"...

The Court

a recovery in a wrongful death action may

not be deemed a part of the estate of a decedent . . . [A]
recovery in a wrongful death action was not a recovery of a
portion of the estate or for the injuries inflicted on the
decedent, but rather for injuries actually suffered by the heirs
of the decedent by reason of the latterfs death."

219 Cal. Rptr.

at 726.
The case at bar also involved a wrongful death action
brought by Plaintiff-Respondent and settled with the third party
tort-feasor's insurance carrier.

Accordingly, Defendant-

Appellant submits that there is no substance to PlaintiffRespondent's argument that Subsection 26-19-13(2) limits, in any
way, the State's right of recovery from the settlement proceeds.
Plaintiff-Respondent attempted, in its argument before
the lower court, to equate a New Jersey statute with the
pertinent Utah statute in order to reach the same result as found
in Hedgebeth v. Hedford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1977).
12

(Exhibit C,

p.l).

In Hedgebetht the New Jersey court found that, under the

New Jersey statute, the State had two avenues of recovery:

a

direct right of recovery against the tort-feasor, and or to seek
recovery by way of the Medicaid recipient through a right of
subrogation.

378 A.2d at 228.

The New Jersey court's interpretation of the New Jersey
statute is correct.

N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7(j) provides that:

"in any

case where such legal liability is found the department [of human
services] shall be subrogated to the rights of the individual for
whom medical assistance was made available."

(Emphasis added).

But, both Utah and Indiana have amended their statutes so as to
remove the subrogation provision.

And, in Utah/ as in Indiana,

"the equitable principles and discretion in determining
reimbursement pursuant to a subrogation statute do not apply to
reimbursement to the State for the Medicaid benefits."

486

N.E.2d at 548.
Although, as contended by Plaintiff-Respondent, a
number of states1 statutes provide for a direct right of recovery
and a subrogation right as to the medicaid recipient, neither
Utah nor Indiana are among those states.

Both now have statutes

that clearly require full recovery from third party settlements
of all medical assistance provided by Medicaid.

U.C.A. § 26-19-

7(2) and Indiana Code 12-1-7-24.6(a) and (b). And, "when the
language is clear and unambiguous and the intent fo the
legislature unmistakable, we must adopt the meaning plainlyexpressed."

471 N.E.2d at 9.
13

Plaintiff-Respondent also fails to properly distinguish
the Federal statutes as applied in Cockerham v. Garuim, 768 F.2d
784 (6th Cir. 1985).

42 U.S.C.A. § 2651 provides that:

"the

United States shall have a right to recovery from said third
person the reasonable value of the care and treatment so
furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right be.
subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased
person, his guardian, personal representative, estate,
dependents, or survivors has against such third person to the
extent of the reasonable value of the care or treatment so
furnished or to be furnished."

42 U.S.C.A. § 2651.

(Emphasis

added) .
In Cockerham, the Government had only subrogation
rights as to the recipient's recovery against the third-party
tort-feasor, and had passively allowed the recipient to bear all
risks and costs of pursuing litigation for recovery.
ct bar, the lower court correctly found that:

In the case

"Defendant's right

of recovery is not an equitable right of subrogation which arises
only after the injured person is made whole."

(Exhibit B, Order

of the Third Judicial District Court, October 16, 1986, p.l) .
(Emphasis added).

The basis for this appeal is that the lower

court then contradicted its own finding and seemingly applied
equitable principles in apportioning the proceeds of the
settlement rather than following the clear requirement of the
statute and allowing full recovery by the State against the
proceeds of the settlement.

Furthermore, unlike the Cockerham

case, the Defendant-Appellant in the case at bar did not stand by
14

passively while the recipient bore the risks of litigation.
Rather, the Plaintiff-Respondent committed a clear violation of
Utah law by bringing its own action against the third party tortfeasor and settling without the statutorily required written
consent of the State, thus attempting to usurp the State's direct
right of recovery.
Subsection 26-19-7(2) of the Utah statute was enacted
to prevent precisely the sort of act committed by PlaintiffRespondent in the case at bar.

Under that Subsection the

Defendant-Appellant is not bound by the settlement entered into
by Plaintiff-Respondent, and/ thus, retains its direct right of
recovery status under which it is entitled to full recovery of
"all medical assistance which it has provided" from the proceeds
of the settlement.
Plaintiff-Respondent's attempt to compare New York's
statutes to Utah's statutes also fails in that, even though the
New York statute may make no mention the word "subrogation", it
clearly limits the State's right to reimbursement and is
structured entirely different than Utah's statute.
N.Y. Soc. Ser. Law § 104(2) provides that:
"No right of action shall accrue
against a person under twenty-one years of
age by reason of the assistance or care
granted to him unless at the time it was
granted the person was possessed of money
and property in excess of his reasonable
requirements, taking into account his
maintenance, education, medical care and
any other factors applicable to his education."
15

For example,

Because, in New York, "an infant's cause of action is
property within the meaning of section 104(2)," and because "an
award for personal injuries compensates for loss by providing a
fund to meet anticipated needs caused by the injury, this fund
can never be considered 'money or property in excess of his
reasonable requirements'."

Kidney by Kidney v. Kolmar

Laboratories, 652 P. Supp. 15, 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Other New

York statutes also limit, in various ways, the effects of liens
against personal injury claims of public assistance recipients.
Utah's statutes must be read on their own terms and
given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.

Contrary to the

conclusion drawn by Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel (Exhibit C,
p.2), the distinctions between statutes providing for a direct
right of recovery and those which do not is of profound legal
significance.

(Exhibit C, p.2).

Plaintiff-Respondent's argument turns largely upon a
strained and illogical interpretation it attempts to give to
U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2).

This subsection provides, in part, that:

"A recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against a
third party for recovery of medical costs . . . without the
department's written consent."

(Emphasis added).

Plaintiff-

Respondent's counsel construes this provision to mean that a
recipient can manipulate a claim or settlement with the tortfeasor or a third-party insurance carrier so as to omit any
mention of medical expense recovery.
16

Thus, "a settlement of any

other item of damage [other than medical costs incurred by
the[recipient] gives defendant no right of recovery at all."
(Exhibit C, p.3). For, "defendant's right of recovery is
triggered only if plaintiff recovers medical expenses."

(Id.)

"Thus, under the statutory scheme, a mixed settlement should give
defendant only a partial right."

(Id.)

The last statement

reflects the position apparently taken by the lower court.
Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel asks us, in effect, to
believe that the legislature, by enacting Section 26-19-7,
intended to create a situation where a Medicaid recipient could
receive staggering sums of state medical assistance, and then
tailor his or her recovery against a tort-feasor or insurer as to
exclude any mention of "medical costs", and, thereby, preclude
the possibility that public funds so expended could be recouped.
The ordinary taxpayer would find that notion ludicrous.
Credulity is strained beyond reasonable limits in trying to
imagine that the legislature could have intended such an effect.
In Peters v. Weatherwax, 731 P.2d 157, 162 (Hawaii 1987), the
Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that such a result is precluded
under the equitable principle of unjust enrichment.
Nor can it be seriously asserted that the legislature
could have intended the approach taken by the lower court.

The

clear meaning of Subsection 26-19-7(2) is that, if a Medicaid
recipient pre-empts the State's direct right of action against a
liable third party, "the department is not bound by any decision,
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim
or in the action, and the department may recover in full from the
17

maintain its right to commence an independent action against the
third party . . . "

U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2).

Plaintiff-Respondent's argument that the provisions of
U.C.A. § 26-19-1 and 7(1)(a) require apportionment between
recovery for special and general damages is without merit.

As

argued in Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Exhibit D, p.5), "This language
deals only with the relative rights of either party to proceed
against third parties and does not in any way speak to the rights
of settlement between the parties."
Even if the lower court was correct in its conclusion
that only a portion of the $20,000.00 settlement represented
medical expenses, it erred in holding that only 16.4% of the
$20,000.00 should be paid to the State.

For, if any portion of

the $20,000.00 can be said to be for medical costs, then, even
under the interpretation given by Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel,
the Plaintiff-Respondent must be considered to have filed "a
claim or [commenced] an action against a third party for recovery
of medical costs . . . without the defendant's written consent."
U.C.A. $ 26-19-7(1)(a).

Plaintiff-Respondent, in its Reply

Brief, acknowledges this point:

"Under U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2),

defendant's right of recovery is triggered only if plaintiff
recovers medical expenses."

(Exhibit C, p.3). If that is true

(and the lower court's decision acknowledges that it is), then,
18

the provisions of Subsection 26-19-7(2) are triggered, and "The
department is not bound . . . and the department may recover in
full from the recipient all medical assistance which it has
provided . . ."
The foregoing observations aside, in interpreting
statutes, the legislative will is the controlling factor.

United

States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 86 L.Ed
671, 62 S. Ct. 445 (1941).

And, it is the duty of the courts,

when engaging in statutory construction, to interpret the words
of the statute in light of the purposes the legislature sought to
serve.

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v.

Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 78 L.Ed.2d 29, 104
S. Ct. 304 (1983);

Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist v. Salt

Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (1983).
Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel attempts to sweep away
as inapplicable a number of cases cited in Defendant-Appellant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Exhibit C, p.4). No doubt

Plaintiff-Respondentfs counsel wishes the cited cases did not
exist, for each is relevant to the issues presented in the case
at bar, and each supports Defendant-Appellant's position.
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Guardianship of Mclntyre,
471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 1984), along with Indiana Dept. of Public
Welfare v. Larson, 486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1985), has
already been discussed supra.
that discussion.

Their relevance is apparent from

Coplien v* Dept. of Health & Social Services,

349 N.W.2d 92 (Wis. App. 1984), demonstrates that even when a
state statute subrogates a state Medicaid claim to the rights of
19

a recipient/ an additional statutory provision that Medicaid
assistance, together with reasonable costs of collection is to be
deducted from any third party settlements, "and the remainder
paid to the public assistance recipient."

349 N.W.2d at 93.

Coplien is also useful in its observation regarding the statutory
scheme set up by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(18), (25) that: "there is
no indication . . . that the agency is limited to recovering a
pro rata share of the settlement proceeds."

349 N.W.2d at 94.

And Coplien distinguishes several cases which denied state
agencies full reimbursement of medical assistance payments where
recipients had not been made whole by their settlements with
liable third parties, then notes that the Wisconsin statute
specifically provides that normal subrogation principles are not
to be applied to an agency seeking reimbursement of medical
assistance payments.

349 N.W.2d at 95.

Thus, even statutes that

provide for subrogation of the state to the recipient may also
provide for full Medicaid reimbursement from third party recovery
when the statute so specifies.

Therefore, even if Plaintiff-

Respondent were correct in asserting that the State of Utah has
only a subrogation right as to the recipient, that assertion
would still be overcome by the express language of the statute
that requires full recovery from the recipient in fact situations
such as those present in the case at bar.

U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2).

(See also Dehaven v. Dan-Co FS Co-Qp, 383 N.W.2d 509 (Wis. App.
1986)).
20

While it is true that Wright v. Department of Benefit
Payments, 153 Cal. Rptr. 474 (App. 1979), and Brown v, Stewart,
181 Cal. Rptr. 112 (App. 1982) were decided under California
Statutes and involved somewhat different issues than presented in
the case at bar, they, nonetheless, clarify important legal
principles that are relevant here. Wright demonstrates that,
when a statute clearly calls for full Medicaid reimbursement from
third party settlements, the courts are not at liberty to erode a
state's right to full recovery.

Brown v* Stewart demonstrates,

among other things, that statutes requiring reimbursement of
medical payments from recovery in third party suits or claims
permit no judicial discretion.

(See Exhibit C, p.4).

Plaintiff-Respondent also questioned the relevance of
Hallmark Nursing Center, Inc. v. Menaldino, 452 N.Y.S.2d 694
(App. Div. 1982) and Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority, 461
A.2d 171 (N.J. 1983).

(See Exhibit C, p.4). These cases were

cited by Defendant-Respondent to demonstrate the general
underlying public policy woven into both Federal and State
statutes:

when a medical recipient's need to be compensated for

their injuries is weighed against the need to conserve public
funds, the public funds have priority.

(See Exhibit D, p.4).

POINT II
NO COSTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7(3), (4) provides that:
21

"The department's written consent, if given,
shall state under what terms the interest of the
department may be represented in an action
commenced by the recipient."
"The department may not pay more than 33%
of its total recovery for attorney's fees, but
shall pay its proportionate share of the cost
of any action commenced in compliance with this
section." (Emphasis added).
Had the settlement reached between the PlaintiffRespondent and the third party's insurer been sanctioned by the
Defendant-Appellant in the manner clearly set forth in Subsection
26-19-7(1)(a), there is no question that, under the terms of
Subsection 26-19-7(4), Defendant-Appellant would have been
obligated to pay up to 33% of its recovery for attorney's fees.
But Subsection 26-19-7(4) adds that such payment is to be made
only as to "any action commenced in compliance with this
section."

Plaintiff-Respondent's action was clearly not

commenced in compliance with this section.

The State did not

give consent, written or otherwise, for Plaintiff-Respondent to
file a claim or commence an action.

Rather, Plaintiff-Respondent

proceeded in direct violation of the statutory requirement and
now seeks to benefit from its own wrongdoing by seeking, not only
the avoidance of a lawful debt owed to the State of Utah, but, to
recover, from the State of Utah, the costs associated with its
unlawful act.
One of the purposes for the written consent requirement
is to avoid actions such as are before this court.

Had the State

been involved (as required by the statute) prior to the
settlement of the claim with the insurance company, then the
State could have negotiated directly to protect its right and
would have participated in the settlement.

Clearly, the effect

of Subsection 26-19-7(4) is to remove cases such as the one at
bar from the Common Fund common law doctrines, and no costs
should be awarded to Plaintiff-Respondent out of the State's
share of the recovery.
POINT III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IS ENTITLED TO A PRO-RATA REIMBURSEMENT
FOR ALL MEDICAL EXPENSES
Should the Court refuse to recognize the argument in
Point I and allow the State only a pro-rata reimbursement of
their expenses based on the Court's finding of the probable total
damages, then a mistake of fact in the memorandum decision should
be corrected.

The Court stated at page 4 of the decision that

the total medical expenses were $39,054.56 and that the State's
$15,018.41 is included in that amount.

As indicated in the State

of Stipulated Facts submitted to the Court for this decision at
paragraphs 3 and 4, the State's $15,018.41 paid the $39,054.56 in
full and was full satisfaction thereof.

The plaintiff paid no

medical expenses whatsoever which are before this Court.
Therefore defendant respectfully requests that the
Court either reduce the total damages by $24,036.15 from
$91,554.56 to $67,518.41 or give the State credit for the entire
$39,054.56 in determining the amount of pro-rata reimbursement
the defendant is entitled to.

This would either allow a 22% or

43% reimbursement to the State.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant-Respondent
respectfully requests that the decision of the lower court be
reversed.
DATED this

-^to

day of August, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

^D^J^

TiS.

DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYE
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and
correct copies of the Brief of the Appellant to the office of
Daniel F. Bertch at 4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84107 on the 26th day of August, 1987.
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This matter is submitted to the Court for decision, based
upon the Affidavits and other pleadings in the file upon stipulation of counsel.

The Court has reviewed the pleadings and

the Affidavits, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the
following Memorandum Decision on the remaining issues.
This matter originally started as a declaratory action
wherein the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment declaring
that the defendant had no right or interest in settlement proceeds
that the plaintiff had received from a liability insurance carrier
as a result of the death of her daughter in an automobile accident
in Nevada on June 15, 1985.

The defendant responded, agreeing

that the matter should be resolved by way of a declaratory action,
and asserted its claim for medical benefits paid on behalf of
the deceased daughter in the amount of $15,018.41.
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After the issues had been joined, the plaintiff brought
a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Following briefing and argument

of the issues raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Summary
Judgment.

In the Court's Order of October 16, 1986, the specifics

on the Motion for Summary Judgment were enumerated.

In summary,

the Court determined by that Order that the plaintiff's rights
were determined by Utah law, not Nevada law; that the defendant's
right of recovery was not an equitable right of subrogation
which arises only after the injured person is made whole, but
rather the defendant has an absolute right of recovery for proceeds
that represent settlement of medical expenses.

The Court further

held in its Order that the defendant's right of recovery does
not extend to proceeds received in settlement of other items
of damages for wrongful death.

The Court then reserved two

issues for resolution.

does the settlement received

First:

from the driver's insurance carrier by the deceased's mother,
the plaintiff herein, include reimbursement for medical expenses,
and, second:

if so, how much of the settlement includes reimburse-

ment for medical expenses.
It is not in dispute that the total amount of settlement
proceeds received from the motor vehicle operator's insurance
carrier was $20,000.00.

The $20,000.00 represents the full

policy limits that would be available against the tort-feasor.
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In view of the nature of the injuries and subsequent death of
the plaintiff's daughter, it is clear to the Court that the
amounts received in settlement, to wit:

$20,000.00, representing

the full policy limits of the driver's insurance represent less
than the total value of the case.

The acceptance of the policy

limits was a matter of practicality on the part of the plaintiff,
as opposed to a representation of the fair value of the plaintiff's
wrongful death claim resulting out of the death of her daughter.
Accordingly, the Court must determine, based upon the matters
before it in the file what the fair full value of the plaintiff's
claim would have been for the wrongful death of her daughter.
The Court is aware of the amount claimed by the defendant, and
the defendant should then be entitled to receive the proportionate
share of the $20,000.00 settlement representing the percentage
of the medical bills it paid to the value of the claim in total.
The plaintiff has submitted an Affidavit of Robert B. Hansen
wherein he estimates the value of this case at $150,000.00.
The Court is also aware of values of these and similar types
of cases as they come before the Court.

The facts which could

be used to evaluate the case are contained in Mr. Hansen's Affidavit.

Recoverable damages for death of a minor include a number

of elements.

A finder of fact may consider the pecuniary benefits

that the plaintiff, Carol Camp, in this case would with reasonable
certainty have received from the earnings and services during
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her daughter's minority which would have extended for two more
years from the date of her death.

Also to be considered is

the support and financial benefit which the plaintiff would
have received with reasonable certainty after the child reached
her majority, and during the period of the parent and child's
common expectancy of life.

Additionally to be considered is

the pecuniary loss suffered in the future by being deprived
of the comfort, society and protection of the child.

The finder

of fact must consider the age of the deceased, and of her mother,
and the state of health and physical condition of each at the
time of the daughter's death.

Funeral expenses and medical

expenses are likewise recoverable.
After careful consideration in this matter, it is the Court's
determination that a finder of fact would assess all of the
liability for the accident upon the driver, and that there would
be no set-off of the plaintiff's recovery by way of comparative
negligence, or otherwise.

It appears that medical expenses

associated with the deceased daughter's care total $39,054.56.
That figure apparently includes the $15,018.41 claimed by the
defendant.

It also appears that the deceased's funeral created

expenses in the amount of $2,500.00.

The Court is satisfied

that special damages for medical expenses and funeral expenses
would then total $41,554.56.

In addition to special damages,

the recovery in this matter would include general damages.
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Taking into account the elements allowed under Utah law for
the recovery of general damages in a wrongful death suit, and
taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of
this case to the extent that they have been made known to the
Court, it is the Court's opinion that a fair and reasonable
amount for general damages would be $50,000.00.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the
fair value of this case for both special and general damages
is $91,554.56.

The amount claimed by the defendant, to wit:

$15,018.41 represents .164% of the total amount of damages,
or the total value of this case.

Accordingly, the defendant

is entitled to recoup from the plaintiff .164% of the $20,000.00
that was actually available, or $3,280.00.

That figure, together

with any interest that may have accumulated while this matter
has been pending and the funds being held by the plaintiff's
counsel are to be delivered over to the defendant as full satisfaction of its claims as set forth in this suit.
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit
the same to the Court for signature and review in accordance
with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this

^

day of March, 1987.

M
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of March, 1987:

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Douglas W. Springmeyer
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
23 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL CAMP,
Plaintiff,

f

ORDER

vs.
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, i
of the Utah State Department }
of Social Services, a Department of the State of Utah,
i
Defendant.

Civil No. C86-377

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Plaintiff1s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
was heard before the Court on September 8, 1986.

After

hearing argument of counsel for both parties and considering
the briefs submitted, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff*s rights are determined by Utah

law, not Nevada law.
2.

Defendant's right of recovery is not an

equitable right of subrogation which arises only after the
injured person is made whole.
3.

Defendant has an absolute right of recovery

for proceeds in settlement of medical expenses.

This right

of recovery does not extend to proceeds in settlement of
other items of damage.

4.

The Court reserved ruling on the other points

raised by the parties.
5.

The .issues remaining in this case are:

(a)

Does the Camp settlement include reimbursement of medical expenses; and

(b)

If so, how much of the settlement includes
reimbursement of medical expenses.

6.

An evidentiary hearing shall be held to

receive evidence concerning the damages which the settlement
/

in question represents.
DATED this

Approved as t o

(OWKh

day of

form:

at
^u^f/

, 1986.

\.J%&lA W

DOWLAS W. SPR^NGMfiYl
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL CAMP,
Plaintiff,

REPLY BRIEF

vs.
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, )
of the Utah State Department
of Social Services, a Department of the State of Utah,
)
Defendant.

Civil No. C86-377

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Plaintiff submits the following brief in reply to
defendant's memorandum opposing summary judgment.

THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE
DEFENDANT'S DIRECT RIGHT OF RECOVERY
Defendant has two avenues of recovery:
right of recovery against the tortfeasor

a direct

(U.C.A., 26-19-5 (1)

and a right of recovery against the recipient (U.C.A.,
26-19-7(2)).

Defendant claims that because it has a direct

right of recovery against tortfeasors, equitable considerations do not apply to its right of recovery against the
recipient.

In fact, this very argument was addressed and

r^jo — e-: in r'.cdgebeth v. Medford, 57S A.2d 2?f '*•:.'., 1 9 " ) .

The main thrust of the State's argument
is related to the fact that it has an
independent right of recovery under the
act. . .But there is no reason to
believe that the existence of an independent right of recovery by the State
should affect the equitable nature of
the State's right where it seeks reimbursement through subrogation.
Id. at 230.

Defendant's direct right of recovery may not be

limited by any equitable considerations.

However, when it

seeks reimbursement from the beneficiary, equity governs.
Defendant attempts to distinguish the cases cited
by plaintiff on the ground that the particular statutes
involved did not create a direct right cf recovery.
simply is not true.

That

In fact, most of the statutes (like

Utah) provide for a direct right of recovery in addition to
an equitable right against the Medicaid recipient.

See Ala.

Code (1975), §22-6-6(a) and 6(b); N.J.S.A. 30:4d-7(j); N.Y.
Sec. Serv. Law, §104 and 104(b) (McKinney, 1968).

Some

provide only for equitable subrogation, N.M.S.A., §13-1-20.1.
The similar Federal statute (for recovery of
federal money spent for medical expenses) contains both a
direct right of recovery against the tortfeasor and a right
cf reimbursement from the recipient.

42 U.E.C.A. 2651.

'.'."her. the Federal government proceeds against the recipient,
e~;itat le principles apply.
7S4 (6th Cir. 1985).

Cockerham v. Garvin, 76S F.2d

The distinction between statutes

providing for a direct right of recovery and those which do
r.ct is of no apparent legal significance.
Defendant further asserts that the absence of the
word "sv.brccstion" ccmoels the Court to cive it full

reimbursement.
cance.

Again, the distinction is of no signifi-

For example, New Yorkfs statute gives the State a

direct right of reimbursement up to the amount of aid
received.

Social Services Law, §104 and 104(b).

No mention

is made of the word "subrogation," yet only that portion of
the settlement containing medical expenses can be recovered.

APPORTIONMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT
IS REQUIRED BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPENSES AND ALL
OTHER DAMAGES WITHOUT REGARD TO EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
This case does not necessarily involve equitable
principles.

Under U.C.A., §26-19-7(2), defendant's right of

recovery is triggered only if plaintiff recovers medical
expenses.

A settlement of any other item, of damage gives

defendant no right of recovery at all.

Thus, under the

statutory scheme, a mixed settlement should give defendant
only a partial right.

Defendant only can recover from

plaintiff to the extent that the settlement includes medical
expense paid by defendant.
Furthermore, the documents attached to defendant's
response reveal that plaintiff had no claim for mecical
expense ar the time she settled.

This is because she had

previously assigned those rights to defendant.

Her settle-

ment cannot include medical expenses because she had assigned her claim for medical expenses to defendant prior to
settlement.

Defendant still has those rights and may still

proceed against Shane Stevens to recover mecical expenses

THE CASES CITED IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S POSITION ARE
INAPPLICABLE TO THE QUESTION INVOLVED
The cases cited by defendant in support of its
position do not apply to the issues in this case.
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Guardianship of r'clntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 1984) and Coplien
v. Department of Health and Social Services, 34 9 N.W.2d 9 2
(Wis. 1984) both involve a statute which specifically sets
forth relative priorities to settlement proceeds.
Wright v. Department of Benefit Payments, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 4 74 (App. 1979) , and Brown v. Stewart, 181 Cal. Rptr.
112 (App. 1982) were decided within the context of a statutory system that limits the State1s recover to one-half of
the recovery after attorneyfs fees.
§14124.78 (1976).

Cal. Welfare Code,

Furthermore, neither case involves the

precise issue raised in this case of the State!s priority to
settlement proceeds.
Hallmark Nursing Center, Inc. v. Menaldino, 452
N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1982) involves the allocation of
medical expense recovery between a hospital and the State
and does

net in anyway involve a recovery which includes

general damages, or the rights of the injured party.
Finally, Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority, 461 A.2d 171
(N.J. 1983) addresses the interplay between the abolition of
the collateral source rule and Medicaid's right of recovery,
a question not involved in this case.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT FAIL TO CITE A
PORTION OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE; DEFENDANT'S
COUNSEL IN FACT CITES THE WRONG SECTION OF THE STATUTE
Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to cite all
of U.C.A., §26-19-13(1), specifically the portion of that
section which refers to defendant's rights against the
recipient.

Defendant's counsel is citing the wrona section!

*

-

Plaintiff relies on 26-19-13 (2) , not on 26-19-13(1) .
Plaintiff cited only 26

-13(2) to the Court.

One only

hopes that defendant's mistaken insinuation is unintentional.
CONCLUSION

This Court should allow defendant to share in the
recovery only to the extei it i t represents recovery of
medical expense.

This result is reached either by equitable

principles, or by simple statutory construction.

Alterna-

tively, under 26-19-13(2), defendant is barred from recovering at all against the estate of Tammy Kadel.
ground, defendant has no right of recovery.

On that

Plaintiff prays

for a declaration cf the rights between her and defendant.
DATED this

<£>

day of i, U-/l/t~n*i. Qx'Y

1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By: J /.. IM<S. •
'

(/IW-

DANIEL F. 3ERTCH

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing P.EPLY BRIEF

(Camp v. Office of Recovery Services)
^

was mailed, U.S. Mai ] , postage prepaid, this
/jcpt

day of

, 1986, to the following:

David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Douglas W. Springmeyer
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84il4
"

//

EXHIBIT D

DAVID I WILKINSON £34 72
Attorney General
Douglas W. Springmeyer, £3067
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-7620
I! i TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL C A M P ,

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-vs~

)

JUDGE HANSON

OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES,
et. a]

)

Civil N o , C-86-377

Plaintiff,

)

Defendants,
Coines now the defendant and respectfully moves
the Cc i ir t: t c! d = : y t: i -e • i: • 1 aintiff's motion fc • ] :

summary

judgment and submits the following memorandum in opposition.
FACTS
Defendant agrees with the facts as set forth
in p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint and m o t i o n , except as follows:
The legal conclusion in paragraph 4 of the
complaint is unjustified.

Although the accident occured

in N e v a d a , all applications for benefits, actual benefits
paid and contacts between the parties occured in Utah.
The plainti£ f i s a Utah resident.
t .'.

As per Defendant's answer, the State of Utah

pad d "!;: 1 5,01 8.41

in medical benefits on behalf c :!: Tammy

Kadel as a result of the accident, but prior to her

filed by the p l a i n t i f f on July 2 2 , 19 8 5 and September 4, IS85,
copies of w h i c h a r e attached as Exhibits "1 & 2 " .
ARGUMENT I
UTAH L A W SHOULD P R E V A I L
U t a h f c • ] 1 c > w ;E , t: I i € g e n e r a 1 r u! e t; h a 1 :i n p r c :i e d u r a 1
issues the l a w of t h e forum state a p p l i e s , whereas other
issues a r e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e state where t h e issue arose.
See C r o f o o t v.- T h a t c h e r , 19 U. 212, 57 P. 1 1 ] (189 9) (Copy
attached)*

Defendant contends that Utah law should apply

pursuant to thi s rul e.
If thi s court determines .that subrogation is the
issue upon which the conf] i c .t c f law should be determined,
then p u r s u a n t to t h e m a j o r i t y line of cases as evidenced
by t h e case of A e t n a v s V RVO.-,- 298 S W

2d 293 (Kentucky 1957)

(Copy attached)' t h e issue should b e determined to b e one
of p r o c e d u r e a n d therefore apply the law of the forum, Utah.
If t h e court d e t e r m i n e s that this is n o t o n e to
be determined o n p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d s , then d e f e n d a n t contends
that this is an issue of contract w h i c h w a s entered into
in U t a h , and Utah lawshould be applied.

Attached as Exhibits

"1 & 2 " , a r e copies of two a p p l i c a t i o n s m a d e by t h e plaintiff
for m e d i c a l and other w e l f a r e a s s i s t a n c e .

On t h e last page

of the a g r e e m e n t is t h e following:
n

I n consideration of M e d i c a l A s s i s t a n c e , I
a s s i g n to the Utah D e p a r t m e n t of Health all
rights to b e n e f i t s o t h e r w i s e p a y a b l e to m e for
m e d i c a l services directly to t h e D e p a r t m e n t
of H e a l t h . If I have a right of recovery
u n d e r an insurance policy or a g a i n s t - a person

m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s paid on m y or m y d e p e n d e n t s
b e h a l f by t h e Utah D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h . "
A n y ' b e n e f i t s paid w e r e as a r e s u l t of this agreem e n t • a n d 1j t a 1 i 3 a w s 1 i o I 11 d a p p ] y .
However, if this court should hold that Nevada
law applies, then Nevada Revised Statutes, §422.293 would
apply and the Court should apply the theory of equitabl e
subrogation^. (Copy attached).
ARGUMENT IIEQUITABLE SUBROGATION DOES NOT APPLY UNDER UTAH LAW
Mf-MiiCc. f I f ir! it.!" i i- r< i - u t ' i e c t
subrogation

tr or, :fcblt*

arguments asserted here by.the plaintiff.

Sect i on 26-1 9-5(1) U.C.A. (1984) makes
it clear that the defendant has a direct right of recovery
on its claim.

This act amended what was previously

Section 26 • i 9 • 4 w h i c h w a s enacted i n 2 9 61 a i i d ex p i e s sly
used t h e term s u b r o g a t i o n in e x p l a i n i n g t h e right of the
department •

recover.

O n e of 11 ie i: r::; i ici p .1 e reasons foi

the r e v i s i o n s w a s t h e d e l e t i o n of any r e f e r e n c e to
s u b r o g a t i o n in t h e eld s t a t u t e .
attached)

(Copies of both sections

T h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e to allow for

a d i r e c t r i g h t of r e c o v e r y is c l e a r .
A l t h o u g h c o u n s e l h a s been u n a b l e t o find any
a u t h o r i t y from U t a h speaking d i r e c t l y to this issue,
and c o u n s e 1 be 1 :i e ve s thi s i s a c: ase i c • f f i n : s t imp r ess icn ,
-3-

there ere many cases from other jurisdictions on this issue.
• important initially to make a distinction
between *
1

. t h statutory language c o ac 1 ied i i 1 ter m s c • f

subrogaticr ' cr.c t- - .« c couched in terms of direct right

C

--• -

:; c 2 tl€:: (5 ]l »V t h e

p ] a 2 l i t II f f

!

S DTI €: *'"

deal with cases of the first type, which are not on pc.-*.
In fact, one of the cases cited State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E. 2d
667 (Ind. App. 1981) has been expressly overruled by
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. "Guardianship of
Mclntyre, 47,3 N.E, 2d 6 (Ind. App, 1984), after the Indiana
legislature amended its statute from one mentioning
to one calling for a direct righ" "

. .-..<-_-:

subrogation

Thereir the

Court cited the case of Copli-en v. Department of Health and
Social Services '(1984) 119 Wis. 2d 52, 34 9 N \ f. 2c 92 , a :: ,.c
quoted that case as follows: "(such argument),,, is 'more
appropriately addressed to the legislature than to this
court.

The legislature . . weighed medical recipients'

need to be compensated for their injuries against the need
for conservation of public funds and determined that the
public funds have priority.

We are required to apply the

statute as it was written by the legislature." Id., 349 N.W. 2d
at 95.

See also Wright v. Department of Benefit Payments

(1979) 90 Cal.App. ed 446, 153 Cal. Rptr. 474; Brown v.
Stewart, (1982) App. 181 Cal. Rptr. 112; Hallmark Nursing
Center Inc. v. Menaldino (1982) 88 A.2d 1042, 452 N.Y.S. 2d
694; cf. Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority (1983) 189

All of the foregoing cases cited are in accord that
equitable subrogation does not apply and the State Agency
in question is entitled to full recovery.

Defendant is

unaware of any authority to the contrary involving statutes
similar to that of Utah's.
ARGUMENT III
THE PROVISIONS OF 26-19-1,7(1) (a) ,7(2) ,13(2) , 9
DO NOT MODIFY THE FOREGOING
Plaintiff seeks to argue in his other points of
argument that the statute in question modifies the rights
of the defendant.

These contention are without merit.

Plaintiff initially argues that §26-19-1 and 7(1)
(a) require apportionment between recovery for special and
general damages.

This language deals only with the relative

rights of either party to proceed against third parties
and does not in any way speak to the rights of settlement
between the parties.

The plaintiff in fact has violated

this provision by proceeding to a settlement of all
damages, as evidenced by the release attached to their
motion, without the permission of the State.
Plaintiff next argues that §26-19-13(2) prohibits
this recovery unless the recipient was over 65 years of
age.

This provision deals only with medical assistance

paid on behalf of recipients for which the department
seeks recovery from the estate of that party where no third
party is involved.

Had the plaintiff made no recovery and

this argument would have validity.

Read in the context

of the entire statute, it is a misconstruction.

It is

also important to note that the plaintiff failed to
cite the entire section in his memorandumf stopping with
the word assistance.

The section has a provision at the

end which reads ..."except as provided by Subsection 26-19-7
(2) and (3)." These sections deal with the recovery from
third parties as in this case and the Section does not
apply.

One hopes that this omission was not intentional.
Plaintiff next contends that by failing to use the

word lien in the reenactment of Section 26-19, the State
has no lien on this recovery.

Plaintiff fails to quote

§26-19-7(2), which states that if the recipient proceeds
without the State!s permission, as occured in this case,
then ..."the department may recover in full from the
recipient all medical assistance which it has provided..."
Plaintiff finally claims that the recovery received
October 2, 1985 and the release signed on November 20,
1985, occured prior to the State having any rights.

As

shown by Exhibits "1 & 2" the State became invovled in
July and again in September, prior to any recovery and
certainly this argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The motion should be denied.
-6-

Dated this 4th day of September, 1986.

Douglas W. S^ra^rneyei
^^istant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was delivered this 4th day of September, 1986
to the following:
Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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